Claremont Colleges

Scholarship @ Claremont
CGU Theses & Dissertations

CGU Student Scholarship

Fall 2019

Essays on the Economics of the National Basketball Association
(N.B.A.): Testing for Inefficiencies in the N.B.A. Labor Market
Samuel S. Lee
Claremont Graduate University

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.claremont.edu/cgu_etd
Part of the Economics Commons

Recommended Citation
Lee, Samuel S.. (2019). Essays on the Economics of the National Basketball Association (N.B.A.): Testing
for Inefficiencies in the N.B.A. Labor Market. CGU Theses & Dissertations, 337.
https://scholarship.claremont.edu/cgu_etd/337.

This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the CGU Student Scholarship at
Scholarship @ Claremont. It has been accepted for inclusion in CGU Theses & Dissertations by an authorized
administrator of Scholarship @ Claremont. For more information, please contact scholarship@cuc.claremont.edu.

Essays on the Economics of the National Basketball Association (N.B.A.):
Testing for Inefficiencies in the N.B.A. Labor Market

By
Samuel Lee

Claremont Graduate University
2019

Approval of the Dissertation Committee
This dissertation has been duly read, reviewed and critiqued by the Committee listed below, which hereby
approves the manuscript of Samuel Lee as fulfilling the scope and the quality requirements for meriting
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Economics.

Thomas Kniesner, Chair
Claremont Graduate University
Professor of Economics

Monica Capra
Claremont Graduate University
Professor of Economics

Hisam Sabouni
Claremont Graduate University
Professor of Economics

Abstract
Essays on the Economics of the National Basketball Association (N.B.A.):
Testing for Inefficiencies in the N.B.A. Labor Market
By
Samuel Lee

Claremont Graduate University: 2019

This dissertation is comprised of three economic essays, that each examine the labor
market for players in the National Basketball Association (N.B.A.). Neoclassical economics
often incorporate models that assume individuals are utility-maximizing agents who behave
rationally. However, many studies in the field of behavioral economics have found evidence of
irrational decision making, both within laboratory environments as well as in natural settings.
The objective of this paper is to provide additional research to this growing body of literature by
using empirical data collected from the N.B.A. to conduct quasi-field experiments. Although
some may question their generalizability, one of the main advantages of using professional sports
data is due to the abundant amount that is meticulously collected and regularly updated.
Additionally, the enormous financial incentives rewarded to professional athletes make a strong
case for the validity and reliability of the results.
The first chapter of this paper looks at whether the quality of program a basketball player
chooses to play while in college, has any significant effects on their future professional careers.
The paper uses salary and performance data from both Division I Men’s N.C.A.A. Basketball as
well as the N.B.A. to compare players who attended what I consider to be “elite college
basketball programs” to those who had offers to play at one of these elite programs but instead

chose to attend another school. The research was partially motivated by an earlier study that
looked at the financial effects of attending more academically selective colleges. Despite the
common belief that academically elite schools would offer greater financial benefits upon
graduation, the researchers found no significant differences in the career earnings of students
who attended elite schools to those who were accepted to elite schools but chose to attend other,
less selective schools. Using several econometric models, the results from this chapter indicate
that players who attended elite basketball programs played fewer minutes in college and delayed
their entrance to the N.B.A., compared to the group that attended non-elite programs.
Furthermore, the career earnings of the group that attended elite schools are found to be
significantly lower when adjusting for relevant variables.
The second chapter uses a sharp regression discontinuity design to examine whether an
N.B.A. player’s career is significantly affected by which side of the round cutoff they were
selected during the league’s annual rookie draft. Traditional economic theory would argue
against any significant differences around this arbitrary cutoff point – one that has been
artificially constructed by the league. Rather, financial compensation and playing time should be
primarily based on a worker’s expected productivity, regardless of where they were selected in
the draft. However, earlier studies that looked at the National Football League (N.F.L.) have
found evidence of substantial differences in compensation, as well as the perceived value of
football players who were chosen before the round cutoffs compared to those selected
immediately after. These initial differences in compensation and perception could create long
term effects on a player’s future productivity. Behavioral economics would attribute these
findings to cognitive biases that humans are vulnerable to when decision making. Contrary to
my initial hypothesis, that results similar to that of the N.F.L. would also occur in the N.B.A., the

findings from this study fail to find any significant differences in player earnings and
productivity at the round cutoffs. These results help support previous studies that found that
earlier inefficiencies that had existed in the N.B.A. labor market, have since disappeared over the
years.
The final chapter of this paper examines the effects the 1995 N.B.A. rookie wage scale
had on the salaries and productivity of players who entered the league after its implementation.
The rookie wage scale was introduced as a means of reducing the guaranteed salaries rookie
players could receive upon entering the league. Using a fixed effects model, the initial test
results show that the rookie wage scale did indeed have a significant negative impact on rookie
salaries. The efficiency wage model of worker productivity predicts that an increase in salaries
should incentivize workers to put forth more effort. If the efficiency wage model is accurate in
describing the behavior of N.B.A. rookies, players who entered the league after the rookie wage
scale will exert less effort because of a decline in their salaries relative to their peers. Assuming
that effort is an important component in a player’s production function, their productivity should
therefore decline compared to similar players who entered the league prior to the wage scale. To
test for this, I compare the career performances of players who entered the league before and
after the rookie wage scale. The results fail to find evidence of a significant difference in
performance; both during the immediate years after signing as well as in overall career
performance. However, results from additional regressions comparing the two groups of players
indicate that the rookie wage scale significantly lowered the average age of incoming players as
well as increased the length of their professional careers.
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The Best May Not Always the Best:
Does “Quality” of School Matter to Basketball Players?
Abstract: This chapter examines the career effects of playing at an “elite basketball school”.
The subjects in this study were all nationally ranked basketball players in high school, who were
highly recruited by Men’s Division I college basketball programs. Each member in the data set
received at least one scholarship offer to attend an elite basketball school, yet some of them
decided to play for other programs. By segmenting the players into two groups, I test whether
there are any noticeable advantages of playing basketball at an elite program. Although many
players from elite programs do go onto have successful professional basketball careers, there
could also be less salient benefits of playing at a non-elite program. Using several econometric
models, I compare the career outcomes of the two groups of basketball players during their time
in college as well as in the National Basketball Association (N.B.A).
The dependent variables I use to compare the two groups of players are: the
number of minutes they played during their freshman year in college, the number of years
players stayed in college, the likelihood of being drafted in the N.B.A., the average pick they
were selected in the draft, and finally the number of years played in the N.B.A. and the average
salaries accumulated over the course of their careers. Despite commonly held beliefs that elite
basketball colleges better prepare players for future success - when controlling for relevant
individual, team and time variables - the regression results indicate that there are no significant
differences between the two groups of players. Furthermore, additional regression results show
that when controlling for those players ranked at the very top of their recruiting class,
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from non-elite schools had more successful careers than their counterparts. A possible
explanation for the findings may be a result of players overestimating the benefits of playing at
an elite school as well as a demonstration of overconfidence in their abilities.

2

1.1 Introduction
The concept of rational, utility maximizing agents plays an integral role in many
neoclassical economic models (Robbins, 1932; Becker, 1991). However, studies in behavioral
economics have found that humans often demonstrate behaviors that are described as contrary to
this axiom (Camerer, 1999; Mullainathan, 2000). Simon (1982) explains that humans are
rationally bounded by the constraints they must face; specifically, information and time.
Therefore, heuristics – a simplified rule of thumb – are commonly used to assist individuals in
making complicated economic decisions (Tversky and Kahneman, 1975). Though often unlikely
to produce optimal results, the use of heuristics generally produces outcomes that provide the
individual enough utility to exceed a minimum threshold, known as satisficing (Simon, 1972).
However, in many important life decisions - such as saving for retirement, selecting a health
insurance plan or choosing a career – the act of satisficing would hardly seem appropriate. Yet,
researchers find instances where even in critical decisions, people tend to make choices using
irrational thought processes that can result in significant negative outcomes (Thaler and Benartzi,
2004; Choi, 2002).
The field of behavioral economics has played an important role in identifying and
explaining many types of irrational behavior. An example of this is the tendency for people to
use what is readily available in their minds to disproportionately influence their decision (Taylor,
1982). Experiments have shown that an irrelevant piece of information given by the researcher
can be used as an anchor for subjects in their decisions without other information is available
(Tversky, 1974). In addition, there is evidence that younger, less experienced decision makers
are more vulnerable to committing irrational behaviors (List, 2003; Scheibehenne, 2005).
3

Although there are many studies that find examples of irrational decision making, many of these
studies have been performed in the laboratory setting. This paper focuses on an important
decision many teenagers must face in the real world.
For the average high school student, several factors might be considered in choosing a
college to attend, such as the academic quality of the school, the distance from home as well as
the financial costs (Gabert, 1999). Under a rational decision-making model, students should
properly weigh all relevant factors and then select the school they believe maximizes their
expected utility. The more colleges a student applies and is accepted to, should increase their
expected utility by reducing their constraints on their choices. However, considering the number
of students who transfer schools, change majors and drop out of school every year, it seems that
many students fail to choose optimally. Research indicates that college students report being
overwhelmed by the number of decisions they are required to make (Scott-Clayton, 2006). As
an example of using heuristics, students may consider school rankings in their decision.
Although useful, many have criticized how these rankings are constructed. Students who
overestimate the importance of these rankings may end up choosing a school that is not in their
best interest (Gnolek, 2014).
The group of basketball players examined in this study must also select a college to
attend. However, due to their athletic abilities, they are afforded different opportunities and
objectives than the typical student. Rather than having to deal with the process of applying to
colleges and anxiously waiting for letters of acceptance, many schools will offer them full-ride
athletic scholarships for their services to the school. These scholarships cover the out of pocket
expenses associated with attending college - such as tuition and room and board. While this
greatly reduces their opportunity costs of going to college, there are also significant implicit
4

costs they must bear as well. Due to their amateur status, student-athletes are prohibited from
receiving any compensation from their athletic talents.1 Additionally, there are enormous
financial incentives for college basketball players to leave school early to play professionally.
The National Basketball Association (N.B.A.) is widely considered the premiere
professional basketball league in the world. In 2017, the average salary of an N.B.A. player was
more than $5 million; with the minimum yearly salary set at more than $200,000 (Basketballreference.com, 2018). Although there could be other factors that a player may consider in
choosing a school, I assume that their decision will be based primarily off maximizing their
career success in the N.B.A, due to the immense financial incentives. However, this decision
could prove difficult when a player has many college offers to choose from. The number of
options the players have available should not only be limited to the schools that have formally
offered them scholarships, but also to schools that have not offered scholarships simply because
of the unlikelihood of the player choosing to attend the school. This number could theoretically
be in the hundreds. Therefore, players may end up using some form of heuristics to help guide
their decision that could ultimately have negative effects on their career objectives.
It is difficult to parse the financial effects of attending a particular school in collegiate
sports. One major hurdle is that every school has a different standard in the types of student
athletes that are accepted. To mitigate this issue of selection bias, this paper uses a similar
approach to an ingenious method that was done by Dale and Krueger in 2006, to look at the
financial effects of attending more academically selective colleges. The researchers limited their
data comparison to students that were accepted into both types of schools. Similarly, this paper

1

Although there have been call for changes to this rule, the NCAA have not shown indications that they are
interested in compensating student-athletes (Sanderson, 2015).
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looks at athletes that chose to attend less prestigious basketball schools despite receiving offers
from the elite programs.
Here is the structure for the remainder of the paper. Section 2 of this paper will provide a
brief overview with respect to college basketball and the N.B.A. In Section 3, I will provide an
extensive literature review of studies that are relevant to this paper. Section 4 provides
descriptions and summarizes the data as well as the methodology used for the studies. Section 5
will provide the empirical models and an interpretation of the results. Lastly, Section 6 will
provide a conclusion to the paper.

1.2 N.C.A.A. College Basketball and the N.B.A.
To understand the context of this paper, it is important to mention the current landscape
of college basketball in the United States. The National Collegiate Athletic Association
(N.C.A.A.) acts as the governing body of Men’s Division I College Basketball, the highest level
of collegiate basketball in the country. The N.C.A.A. has established rules that are intended to
create a competitive market for schools to recruit players. One important rule is that colleges are
unable to compete for players by offering financial compensations, which would give resource
rich programs an unfair advantage. Despite these rules, the distribution of talent is not evenly
distributed among the participating schools. In general, a handful of “elite basketball programs”
are known to consistently recruit the highest ranked players. As an example, in 2016, the
University of Kentucky had a recruiting class that was comprised of five players that were all
ranked in the Top 50 in the entire nation. Considering that there are over 300 Division I
basketball schools, for a single team to acquire ten percent of the top incoming players clearly
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shows that there are high levels of talent inequity among schools. Table-1 shows a list of the
Top 30 ranked high school basketball players in 2016. Of the 30 players listed, 24 of them chose
to attend an elite program. 2 The players who decide to play for an elite school must believe
there are significant advantages for their future success compared to all other programs.
As noted before, talented college basketball players have strong financial incentives to
play in the N.B.A. as soon as they are prepared to do so. A player who remains in school for all
four years of their collegiate eligibility are thought to have stayed, not out of choice but because
they would most likely not have been drafted had they left school earlier.3 For many years,
colleges have had to deal with the risk of losing players early to the N.B.A. However, recent
changes to the N.B.A. collective bargaining agreement have heightened the effects. Under
previous league rules, the most talented high school players were able to enter the league as soon
as they had completed high school.4 This allowed the most talented high school players to
bypass college altogether. However, in 2006, the N.B.A. imposed a controversial rule that made
it mandatory for all incoming players to have been at least one year removed from playing in
high school.5 The rule was created to mitigate concerns that high school players were not
physically nor mentally mature enough to head directly to the N.B.A.6 Since most of the players
who might have gone directly to the N.B.A. otherwise, will disproportionately now choose to

2

Although every school is unique and a standard definition of what an elite basketball school does not exist, I will
give a more detailed explanation of how I define an elite school later in this paper.
3
There are notable exceptions, such as Tim Duncan, who played in college all four years and was selected first in
the NBA draft.
4
Some of the most notable players who have played in the league, such as Kobe Bryant, Lebron James and Kevin
Garnett, all went directly from high school.
5
Prior to the rule, there were several notable players who announced their intention to forego college and go straight
to the NBA.
6
Those who supported the rule used previous cases of players who had skipped college and were unsuccessful in the
league.
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play for the elite schools, these programs must deal with the risk of losing their players even
earlier.7
College basketball programs try to counteract the problem of early player attrition by
often recruiting more players than there are available minutes for all their players. There are
typically thirteen players on a college basketball team, yet only five of them can play at any
given time. Each player is further constrained for playing time by the position they play.8 In
general, the starters on a team end up playing the majority of available minutes, while the
remaining players are forced to sit on the bench. Schools may recruit additional players to sit on
the bench to have quality players ready to replace starters when they are fatigued. Recruiting
extra players can also act as a form of insurance in the case starters get injured. However,
coaches may also be incentivized to recruit players without having any intention of playing them
significant minutes during their freshman year. Instead, they may choose to keep them on the
bench in hopes of convincing them to return for another year. Although this will help the
program by retaining talented players, it may prevent certain players from optimizing their career
objectives by keeping them in college longer.
Prospective players who are uncertain of their draft status must consider the risks
involved in leaving school too early. Until recently, by declaring for the N.B.A. draft and
signing a sports agent, a player would permanently lose their amateur status and not be able to
return to school if they ended up deciding they would like to go back. As a result, players who
were not selected during the draft are unable to improve their draft stock by returning to play in
college but must find another route to make it to the league. Even if a player is confident that

7
8

Although Kobe Bryant never went to college, he said he would have gone to Duke; one of the elite schools.
There are five positions in basketball and most players are confined to playing one or two positions.
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they will be selected in the draft, he could find it beneficial to return to school in order to
improve his draft stock for the following draft. The N.B.A. draft is comprised of two rounds –
players selected in the first round have guaranteed offers, while second rounders are not given
any contract guarantees. Elite schools that could benefit from players returning may use this fact
to convince players that did not receive much playing time during their first year into staying in
school for another year. In a counterfactual scenario, where a player had gone to another school,
they may have been able to start immediately.9 If on court experience is a significant factor in a
player’s future success, players talented enough to be recruited by an elite school but not likely
to start early on, would be better off playing for a less prestigious school.
Since college programs are unable to compete for players financially, another approach in
recruiting players might be to emphasize the successful careers previous players from their
program have gone on to have in the N.B.A. Recruiters may attribute this to their schools having
better resources such as – superior coaches, the latest state of the art facilities, higher levels of
competition, more recognition and a culture of winning– that help prepare players for the N.B.A.
However, all this salient information could be misleading and inaccurate. Even though there are
actual benefits these elite programs offer, they should also be weighed against the costs
associated with playing at a more competitive school. Since an elite program begins with a
greater number of highly ranked players playing for their schools compared to other schools, we
would expect to see more successful players coming for these schools independent of any effects
the school itself had on a player’s future outcome. A greater number of players who played at

9

A relevant situation comes from college football. In 2009, Pete Carroll, the coach of the University of Southern
California, criticized his quarterback at the time, Mark Sanchez for leaving school early for the NFL. Carroll stated
that he thought the quarterback was not prepared for the league. Sanchez was selected fifth overall in that year’s
NFL draft.
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elite schools may have also gone on to have unsuccessful careers. Without taking this into
consideration, players may overestimate the benefits an elite program contributes to their future
success.
If there are indeed overall net positive effects of attending an elite basketball school, the
data should show that players who played at these schools were better off than had they chosen
to play at a non-elite school. Although a method for testing the counterfactual is not possible for
this study, I use similarly ranked high school players that were also recruited by elite schools but
chose not to attend, as a control group for comparison. Although there could be unobservable
differences between the groups of players, this will significantly reduce the selection bias that
would result if simply comparing the careers of all the players in Division I basketball. Based off
previous research, I hypothesize that the results will indicate that the benefits of playing at an
elite basketball program are highly overestimated. The following section provides a literature
review of previous work relevant to this paper and that will help support my hypothesis.

1.3 Literature Review
Sports and behavioral economics are both relatively new topics of research in the field of
economics. The rise in their popularity coincides with improvements in technology that have
allowed for researchers to probe more finely into the area of sports economics. Despite
criticisms about the generalizability of sports to the broader world, one of its main benefits is the
abundance of accurate and up to date data that researchers have available. Additionally, the high
salaries of professional athletes create a natural environment combined with strong financial
incentives that make the observations reliable. The field of behavioral economics has used
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sports to find many evidences of irrational behavior despite the competitive nature of
professional leagues. The following section describe several earlier studies in the field and their
findings.
One of the earliest studies that incorporated sports and behavioral economics in its
research examined the concept of the “hot hand” in the N.B.A. (Gilovich, Tversky, 1985). Prior
to the paper’s findings, it was thought that N.B.A. players experienced episodes of “hot” and
“cold” streaks of shooting during games. A player who made several baskets in a row was
considered more likely to make his next shot than if he had previously missed consecutive shots.
However, when the researchers looked at shot data from one of the league’s teams and controlled
for each player’s individual shooting ability, they found no evidence of the hot hand. One
explanation the researchers gave as to why casual observers were susceptible to this false belief
was due to the “availability bias” (Tversky, 1974). The availability bias states that humans often
overweight memory that is easily available and most recent in our minds to construct a future
probability of likelihood that is inaccurate. However, some later studies have criticized the
methodology of the paper and have tried to account for important variables that the initial study
did not measure, such as the increased amount of attention that a player would get from the
opposing team when he makes consecutive shots. When controlling for these variables, the
researchers find evidence supporting the idea that players do in fact experience streaks of being
“hot” and “cold” (Camerer, 1989; Ayton, Fischer, 2004).
Studies have also used data from the N.B.A. to study a wide variety of economic topics,
ranging from racial discrimination to problems of moral hazard. In an early study, Kahn (1988)
found evidence of salary discrimination. The study showed that black players were paid
significantly less than their white counterparts. However, a following study showed that
11

discrimination in salaries against black players have since disappeared (Bodvarsson, 1999). The
researchers claimed this was due to greater strength in the league’s players union that made it
more difficult for owners from discriminating on race.
Another study found evidence of racial discrimination amongst N.B.A. referees (Price,
2010). The findings showed that referees called more fouls against players of the opposite race.
This would seem like an irrational behavior since referees are evaluated on their performance
and should not have any incentive to discriminate. Not only has there been evidence of
discrimination but studies also finding evidence of referees point shaving (Gibbs, 2007). This is
not surprising since a referee by the name of Tim Donaghy was found guilty and sentenced to
prison for having engaged in point shaving.
Sports also provides a useful area of research in looking for evidences of moral hazard
since there are quantitative methods available to measure player productivity. One related study
found evidence of moral hazard behavior among N.B.A. players. The paper found that a player’s
performance declines the further they are away from their next contract. Additionally, a player’s
performance significantly improves the year prior to becoming a free agent (Stiroh, 2007). The
research attributes this to the fact that N.B.A. player contracts are fully guaranteed regardless of
future productivity. Another paper by Staw and Hoang (1995), finds evidence that N.B.A. teams
are guilty of incorporating “sunk costs” in their decision making. The researchers found that
teams will give more minutes to a player simply because they were selected earlier in the draft
rather than based strictly on their productivity. A team’s inability to remove the memory of sunk
costs that were already paid and cannot be reimbursed will continue to have negative effects into
the future. Finally, studies have looked at college data to determine a player’s future outcome in
the N.B.A. A study by Berri (2006) showed that players who scored more in college were likely
12

to be drafted earlier, even though scoring is not a great measure of future performance. Another
study found that the conference a player played in has a significant effect on their future draft
status (Coates, 2010). This paper looks to add to this growing body of literature by looking at the
effects the quality of the college program has had on the careers of basketball players.
Another motivation for this paper comes from earlier research performed by Dale and
Krueger (2002), that compared the career earnings of graduates from Ivy League schools to those
of less selective state schools. Unsurprisingly, an Ivy League graduate earns significantly more
on average than a state school graduate. However, the researchers wanted to look at whether the
qualities of schools contributed to the difference in earnings, or if higher earning members more
often self-selected themselves to better schools. The researchers obtained access to data that
allowed them to focus their study on students who were granted admission to both types of
schools. The researchers found that when limiting their observations to these students, the
quality of school had no significant effect on average earnings between the two groups. The
results supported the hypothesis that the institution one attends has less importance on future
earnings compared to one’s own ability. It could also be the case that there are benefits of
attending a less selective school that people often overlook. The current study takes this concept
and tests whether it could be generalizable to sports.

Relative Deprivation and the “Big Fish Little Pond Effect” (B.F.L.P.E)
In his book, “David and Goliath”, the author Malcolm Gladwell discusses the concept of
“relative deprivation.” The term, originally coined by early sociologist Samuel Stouffer, states
that humans are not accurate calculators of absolute measurements. Instead, we often use those
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immediately around us to gauge are relative circumstance. The book cites a study that found that
top academic researchers at lower ranked schools were shown to produce a higher score in
journal publications compared to peers at more prestigious programs but who were not among
the elite researchers at their respective schools (Conley and Onder, 2014). One theory that is
proposed by the authors states that students at the less prestigious schools receive more
mentoring and care from their colleagues. On the other hand, at prestigious schools, competition
for limited resources will go disproportionately to those at the very top, leaving the remaining
researchers relatively deprived. In the context of this paper, the limited resources could be in the
form of the amount of attention given by their coaches, access to trainers and facilities, and the
amount of playing time.
Another similar concept that discusses the negative effects of greater competition is
known as the Big Fish, Little Pond Effect (BFLPE) (Marsh and Parker, 1984). The researchers
looked at the self-perceived academic ability of similarly abled students who attended different
quality schools. The researchers found that those who attended the better-quality schools selfreported lower levels of academic ability. The study provides further evidence that humans use
others around them as a reference for their own overall ability. Additionally, the researchers
performed a longitudinal study that showed that the students who reported lower perceived
ability demonstrated lower performances in subsequent performances.
Researchers later looked at whether the BFLPE had any role in one’s own perception of
athletic ability (Chanal, Marsh, 2006). The study asked children to rate their gymnastic ability
after they had participated against different levels of performers. Here, the results showed
similar findings. Those competing against better competition, self-reported a lower overall
ability. This was considered the first study that looked at the relationship between BFLPE and
14

sports. The current paper tries to expand the literature by using college athletes to look at actual
outcomes rather than simply their self-perceptions.
There is also an abundance of research that have looked at the benefits of being around a
more competitive environment. The environmental press theory states that attending a more
selective college can benefit students by increasing one’s motivation through greater
competition. Wert and Watley (1969) compared the effects of relative deprivation to that of the
environmental press theory and found evidence that showed the former had a greater effect. In
an experiment that compared the preference for competition, Niederle (2007) found that men
prefer more competitive environments to women. However, the study also found men to have
more overconfidence, which leads to them engaging in competition that goes beyond the optimal
amount.
Another robust finding in behavioral economics, is that people often demonstrate
overconfidence in their own abilities (Kahneman, 1997). Players may select an elite school if
they overestimate their likelihood of becoming a starter. One study finds that participants, when
asked to evaluate the performance of average driver’s or the likelihood for a business to fail,
have an accurate understanding of the statistics. Despite having this information, they will
overestimate the likelihood of their own success (Camerer, 1999). Furthermore, men are more
likely to be overconfident in their abilities (Barber, 2001 Malmendier, 2005). This is further
exasperated when the task is one that the participant feels they are good at (Spiers-Bridge, 2010).
In college sports, the problem has been addressed by Mark Emmert, the NCAA’s president. In
one of his speeches, he is quoted as saying "athletes often have incredibly unrealistic perceptions
of their professional prospects."

15

The Effects of Choice Overload
In traditional economics, choices are often thought of as goods that are utility improving.
A decision maker should not have any negative effects if they are offered additional choices,
since all previous options remain available. However, studies have shown that consumers are
less satisfied with their purchases when offered too many choices (Iyengaar, 2000). Schwartz
(2004) found that subjects describe having higher expectations and more regret when given more
choices. Researchers have used several terms such as “choice overload”, “the paradox of
choice” and “decision paralysis” to describe these effects. A meta-analysis found that choice
overload can be exacerbated if the decision maker is inexperienced and unable to easily compare
the different options (Scheibehenne, 2010). This can be applicable to this study, since every
player will have many schools to choose from. If a player is uncertain which school is best
suited for them, they may try to simplify their decision by using whatever is most salient. This
would cause players to overlook many benefits other schools would have to offer.

1.4 Data and Methodology
All relevant data used in this paper comes from the following websites: Sportsreference.com, Basketball-reference.com and 247sports.com. Sports-reference.com is one of the
leading websites in collecting and updating individual player and team data for N.C.A.A. Men’s
Division I college basketball. 247sports.com is one of the premiere websites for ranking high
school basketball prospects by class. The website ordinally ranks the Top 100 high school
basketball players every year. In addition, since certain classes of players are considered to be
stronger than other years, it also provides a cardinal rating of each individual player on a scale
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from 0 to 1. Lastly, the website, Basketball-reference.com, was used to collect player
performance as well as player salary data for the N.B.A.
The complete data set is comprised of 210 high school basketball players who were
ranked in the Top 30 of their recruiting class according to 247sports.com from the years, 2006 to
2012. I chose to limit the data to these years since prior to 2006, high school players were not
required to attend college and could go straight to the N.BA. Every one of the players were
recruited by at least one elite school. This information is verifiable since the website 247.com
lists all the schools that officially offered an athletic scholarship to each of the players. This
information is critical because it implies that players who did not attend an elite school chose to
do so voluntarily. Although thirty could be considered an arbitrary number, I chose this figure as
the cutoff as it coincides with the current number of first round selections in the N.B.A. draft. If
the high school rankings are highly accurate, each player would have a realistic chance of
playing in the N.B.A. and therefore provide a sufficient sample size for conducting the study.
Additionally, even among these top recruits, there are certain players that are ranked
considerably higher than their peers. Therefore, I further segment some of the players at the very
top of their class who were rated at least .999 by 247Sports.com and list them as, super recruits.
Unfortunately, a precise definition of what constitutes as an “elite basketball school” does
not exist and can be debatable. For the sake of this paper, I created a list of schools that fall into
this category based off a criterion which used the following factors - championships won, recent
and overall program success, program revenue and recruiting rankings. Based off this
methodology, there were ten schools that were considered elite programs. The schools that were
selected are: Duke, North Carolina, Michigan State, UCLA, Villanova, Syracuse, Kentucky,
Arizona, Kansas and Indiana. Table-2 shows the list of schools with the highest winning
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percentage of all time. Six of these programs rank in the Top 7 of all time wins, while all of
them are in the Top 15. The other schools were left off due to their lack of recent success.
Every school has won multiple NCAA championships and has had many of their players play in
the N.B.A.10 Another note of importance is that all the schools listed are considered primarily
basketball schools and compared to another major sport such as football. All other schools that
are not included are considered non-elite. Although there could be an argument for significant
disparities even among non-elite schools in terms of basketball quality, I do not segment the
quality of schools any further. The outcome measurements I use as dependent variables are: the
amount of playing time during their freshman season, the likelihood of being drafted in the
N.B.A, the draft pick they are selected, the average number of seasons played in the N.B.A. and
their career earnings in the N.B.A.

1.5 Empirical Models and Results
Table-3 provides descriptive statistics that compares the players that attended an elite
school to those who attended all other programs. Of the total, 210 players in the data set - 106 of
them attended an elite school and 104 played at other schools. This provides us with a balanced
number of data points for each group. The average career earnings of players in the data set is
$15.64 million. Those who attended elite schools earned slightly less, $15.33 million, compared
to $15.94 million for those who went to all other schools. The results from the statistics show

10

One exception is Syracuse, which has only won one NCAA championship. However, considering the other factors
used in comprising the list, I believe they fall into the elite school category.
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that there are no significant differences in the observable characteristics between the two groups
of players.

Effects of Attending an Elite School on Freshman Playing Time
The first test I conducted looked at the immediate effects the quality of school had on the
players. I assume that an important factor in selecting the ideal basketball program to play for
involves the amount of playing time one initially receives. I hypothesize that players attending
non-elite schools will receive more playing time compared to those who attend elite schools due
to less competition from teammates. To confirm my hypothesis, I used a fixed effects model to
test for any significant differences in playing time between the two groups of players during their
freshman year in college. The log-linear regression model I used was
(
where

)=

+

+

+

+

indicates a vector of control variables such as a player’s race, position, the

class year and other important factors that would affect playing time such as injuries or academic
ineligibility. Additionally, the variable,

! , indicates a dummy variable, where

= 1 if a

player attended an elite school and 0 if they did not. $ , indicates a year fixed effects term. The
last term,% is the idiosyncratic error term. The results from the model are reported in Table-4.
The initial results indicate that players at non-elite school’s players play 19.6% more minutes
compared to those who attend elite schools. The results are statistically significant at the 1%
level and consistent with my earlier hypothesis. Players at elite schools are less likely to be a
starter during their freshman year since there are other highly recruited players that are fighting
for limited playing time.
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I then controlled for players who I considered to be super recruits by incorporating the
dummy variable, super recruit, where a value of 1 is given if a player is a super recruit and 0
otherwise. The following formula describes the model:
(

)=

+

+

+ & '(

)) *)(

+

+

Table-4 also shows the results of controlling for super recruits on freshman playing time.
Column (3) includes an interaction term between elite schools and super recruits as well. The
results show that super recruits received more playing time regardless of the school they
attended. This will further negatively impact playing time for the remaining freshman players at
the elite schools. Those attending non-elite schools now have 32.9% more playing time. The
results from both models - with and without controlling for super recruits - were significant at the
1% level. These findings are important if on-court minutes are critical for players to gain
experience in preparation for their professional careers.

The Effects of Playing at an Elite School on Years in College
The next test was to determine whether there were any differences in the amount of years
a player stayed in college between the two groups. As explained earlier in this paper, I assume
that highly ranked players want to play in college for the minimum amount of time that is
necessary. The longer a player stays in college indicates that they are not considered ready to
play professionally. To test this, I ran a fixed effects model using the number of years a player
stayed in college as the dependent variable:
+

)'

,-

=

+
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The variables on the right-hand side are identical to the ones used in the previous model.
The results are listed in Table-5. The figures show that when controlling for individual
variables, the players who attended elite schools stayed in college on average 0.275 years longer.
The results are significant at the 1% level. Next, I again control for players that I consider to be
super recruits. When controlling for super recruits, the findings show the difference between
groups is even greater. Non-super recruit players who choose to attend elite college players
remain in college 0.528 years longer than their counterparts, which is also statistically significant
at the 1% level. Although considered an advantage for most students, to these basketball players
this is an indication that they are concerned over their readiness to play in the N.B.A. The longer
they remain in school, increases their opportunity cost due to foregone earnings they could be
making in the N.B.A.

The Effects of Elite Schools on the Likelihood of Being Drafted in the N.B.A.
I then tested to see how school differences effected the next stage in the player’s careers
by examining the likelihood of being drafted in the N.B.A. The next study was to see whether
there were any differences in the likelihood of being selected in the N.B.A. draft, regardless of
where a player was drafted. Every year there are 60 players selected in the N.B.A. draft.
Although there are significant differences in being selected early in the draft compared to being
selected near the end, I do not distinguish by round or selection number. I test this using a logit
model where the dependent variable is the probability of being drafted as follows:
-

(.) / 0 |

= 1) =

+
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The logit model has advantageous properties that limit the probability from being
between 0 and 1. I first include all players in the data set, controlling for several variables
including year, race and whether there were any other issues such as injuries that would
influence the dependent variable. As shown in Table-6, there is a negative effect elite schools
have on the likelihood of being drafted. The results indicate they are 0.00329 times less likely to
be drafted, but this is a small discrepancy that is not significant at any level. Additionally, Table7 shows the log odds ratio of the likelihood of being drafted between players who attended elite
schools to non-elite ones.
I then control for super recruits adding the dummy variable, super recruit. Although the
results show an even greater effect, players who attend elite schools are now 0.407 times less
likely to be drafted, it did not reject the null hypothesis at the 10% level. It is clear though that
the super recruits have a much higher likelihood of being drafted compared to the rest of the
group.

The Effects of School Quality on Draft Position
The fourth test I performed looked at whether there were any differences in the draft
number a player was selected. For an N.B.A. prospect, it is not only important to be drafted, but
selected early. The N.B.A. plays their rookies using a wage scale system where players selected
early in the draft make significantly more compared to those at the very end. Also, those selected
in the first round are guaranteed contracts, while second rounders do not. Therefore, a player
may get selected in the second round but never sign an N.B.A. contract. I use an ordinary least
squares (OLS) model where the dependent variable is the draft number.
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A positive value on an independent variable would indicate that a player will be selected
later in the draft, which will have a negative effect on career outcome. The results are listed in
Table-7. The initial results, without controlling for super recruits indicate that players who
attended elite schools were taken 0.299 picks later. Further, controlling for super recruits, the
results showed that players who attended elite schools were drafted 4.1 picks later. However,
these results did not reject the null hypothesis that elite schools had no effect on where a player
was drafted. I also incorporated a Tobit model to control for the fact that the draft is limited to
60 players. I give a player that is not chosen in the draft a selection number of 61 as the upper
limit. Although, this distorts the data, I propose it is not significant considering the number of
players given this value. Also, I expect there to be a small difference of having had been the 61st
versus a later number to a player’s career. Columns (3) and (4) in Table-8 are the results from
the Tobit model, with and without controlling for super recruits. When controlling for super
recruits, the Tobit model shows that players attending elite schools are drafted 6.7 positions later.
However, this too is not considered significant at any level.

The Effects of School Quality on N.B.A. Career Earnings
Finally, in order to test the career financial impact of playing at an elite school, I
compared the career earnings of the two groups using the following structural earnings models.
, )

)3 )

' =

+

+

+

+

The initial results that are listed in Table-8 show that the players from elite schools
earned on average $1.107 million less, but the difference was not considered statistically
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significant. The insignificant results are still noteworthy because common perception would
assume that there would be a significantly positive effect of playing at an elite school.
Furthermore, when controlling for the super recruits, the remaining players saw a
decrease in earnings of $6.64 million that was significantly different at the 5% level. This
indicates that most of benefits of going to an elite school are gained by the elite players of that
school, while the remaining players are negatively affected. A Tobit model to control for the fact
that some players will have a lower bound at $0 for those who did not play in the league is also
listed. This increases the discrepancy of the two groups of non-super recruit players to $10.63
million, which is also significant at the 5% level.
To address concerns of heteroskedasticity in the error term, I also ran a log-linear model
that uses log earnings as the dependent variable.
(* )

)

)

' )=

+

+

+

+

When controlling for super recruits as well as the other independent variables, there is a
significant decrease in the log salary of player’s attending an elite school compared to those who
did not. Table-10 shows the regression results. On average, players who attended elite programs
were shown to have career earnings that are 42,4% lower compared to those who attended nonelite programs, that is significant at the 10% level. A Tobit model on the lower bound of log
earnings is also calculated. The results show that the difference is 35% but no longer considered
statistically significant.
Overall, there are strong indications that players are negatively affected by attending elite
programs compared to players who attended other non-elite schools. The results show that
players who attend elite school are likely to stay in school longer and have a decline in earnings
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over the course of their N.B.A. career. The results may be a consequence of many high school
players overestimating their abilities by choosing to play at an elite school when they would be
better off elsewhere.

1.6 Conclusion
One of the main axioms in neoclassical economics is the belief that people are generally
rational decision makers. However, experiments and empirical data indicate that this is often not
the case. Research in behavioral economics has made it apparent that humans are susceptible to
cognitive biases such as the availability bias and the overconfidence bias. Irrational behavior
becomes more evident and harmful when dealing with significant life altering decisions that can
have large financial implications, such as selecting a college to attend. Additionally, external
effects such as the feeling of “relative deprivation” and “the Big Fish, Little Pond Effect” can
have significant impact on one’s outcomes.
This paper looked specifically at the effect’s college choice had on highly recruited
basketball players. The results from this study finds evidence that college basketball players may
overweight the benefits of attending elite basketball schools. Ultimately, this results in negative
effects to their career outcomes, especially for those not at the very top of their class. Players
who attend elite programs do not play as many minutes during their freshman year, which likely
diminishes their probability of being drafted and playing in the N.B.A. The results also show
that this decision leads players to spend extra time in college when they could be playing
professionally. Finally, their career earnings are substantially lower compared to similarly
ranked players who did not attend elite schools. As shown by the data, the consequences are not
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trivial. The results cast doubt on the idea that elite programs better prepare their players for
success in the N.B.A.
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Table-1. Rankings of High School Basketball Players in 2016
Rank

Player

Pos

School

State

College

T1
T1

Harry Giles
Josh Jackson

PF
SF

Oak Hill
Prolific Prep

VA
MI

Duke
Kansas

3

De’Aaron Fox

PG

Cypress Lakes

TX

Kentucky

4

Jayson Tatum

SF

Chaminade

MO

Duke

T5

Dennis Smith Jr.

PG

Trinity Christian

NC

NC State

T5

Malik Monk

CG

Bentonville

AR

Kentucky

7
8

Lonzo Ball
Markelle Fultz

PG
CG

Chino Hills
DeMatha Catholic

CA
MD

UCLA
Washington

T9

Edrice Adebayo

PF

High Point Christian

NC

Kentucky

T9

Jonathan Isaac

SF

IMG Academy

FL

Florida St.

11

Miles Bridges

SF

Huntington Prep

WV

Michigan St.

12

Terrance Ferguson

SG

Advanced Prep

TX

Alabama

13
14

Frank Jackson
Rawle Alkins

PG
SG

UT
NC

Duke
Arizona

15

Wenywen Gabriel

PF

MA

Kentucky

16
17

T.J. Leaf
Kobi Simmons

PF
CG

Lone Peak
Word of God
Wilbraham &
Monson
Foothills Christian
St. Francis

CA
GA

UCLA
Arizona

18

Josh Langord

CG

Madison Academy

AL

Michigan St.

19

Marques Bolden

C

DeSoto

TX

Duke

20

Jarrett Allen

PF

St. Stephen’s

TX

Texas

21

Omari Spellman

C

McDuffie

MA

Villanova

22
23
24

PF
SF
SF

Norland
Sacred Heart
Paul VI

FL
CN
VA

Miami
Auburn
Louisville

PF

Virginia Episcopal

VA

Kentucky

26

Dewan Huell
Mustapha Heron
V.J. King
Sacha KilleyaJones
Tyus Battle

SG

St. Joseph

NJ

Syracuse

27
28

Udoza Azubuike
Cassius Winston

C
PG

Potters House
University Detroit

FL
MI

Kentucky
Michigan St.

29

Tony Bradley

C

Bartow

FL

North Carolina

30

Juwan Durham

PF

Tampa Prep

FL

Connecticut
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Table-2. Overall Winning Percentage of Division 1 Basketball Programs

1

Kentucky*

1903

114

2,237

688

.765

2

North Carolina*

1911

107

2,206

781

.739

3

Kansas*

1899

119

2,217

841

.725

4

Duke*

1906

112

2,115

873

.708

5

UCLA*

1920

98

1,805

824

.687

6

Syracuse*

1901

116

1,755

880

.666

7

Western Kentucky

1915

98

1,724

901

.657

8

Arizona*

1905

112

1,750

923

.655

9

Louisville

1912

103

1,680

901

.651

10

Notre Dame

1898

112

1,845

994

.650

11

Villanova*

1921

97

1,709

920

.650

* These are all teams that I consider to be elite schools. Indiana was 20th and Michigan St., though not
listed in the Top 20 has won 2 NCAA championships and has consistently been one of the best teams
over the past decade.
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Table-3. Descriptive Statistics by Schools

(1)
Overall

(2)
Elite

(3)
Non-Elute

Earnings

15.64
(26.73)

15.33
(27.34)

15.96
(26.23)

YearsinNBA

3.367
(3.258)

3.302
(3.249)

3.433
(3.282)

Drafted

0.667
(0.473)

0.670
(0.473)

0.663
(0.475)

YearsinSchool

2.600
(1.179)

2.736
(1.221)

2.462
(1.123)

MinFresh

758.6
(315.6)

706.9
(330.3)

811.3
(292.2)

Black

0.881
(0.325)

0.868
(0.340)

0.894
(0.309)

210

106

104

N

mean coefficients; sd in parentheses
*
p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table 4. Regression Results – Freshman Playing Time

VARIABLES
Elite School

(1)

(2)

(3)

LN(FreshMin)

LN(FreshMin)

LN(FreshMin)

-0.196***
(0.0743)

-0.253***
(0.0751)
0.345***
(0.0919)

-0.023
(0.0342)
-0.055
(0.0732)
-0.0686
(0.129)
-0.699***
(0.123)
0.162
(0.107)

-0.032
(0.0573)
-0.063
(0.0886)
-0.119
(0.125)
-0.662***
(0.119)
0.137
(0.104)

-0.319***
(0.0808)
0.118***
(0.0153)
0.354*
(0.190)
-0.045
(0.0473)
-0.075
(0.0895)
-0.110
(0.125)
-0.633***
(0.120)
0.127
(0.104)

6.537***
(0.120)

6.475***
(0.117)

6.502***
(0.117)

210
0.260

210
0.272

Super Recruit
Super Recruit * Elite School
Black
Position
Foreign
Issues
Year

Constant

Observations
R-squared

210
0.206
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 5. OLS Regression – The Effect of Attending an Elite School on Years in College

VARIABLES
Elite School

(1)
YearsinCollege

(2)
YearsinCollege

(3)
YearsinCollege

0.275*
(0.165)

0.468***
(0.152)
-1.284***
(0.190)

-0.230
(0.225)
0.0108
(0.257)
0.185
(0.269)
-0.219
(0.239)

-0.180
(0.203)
-0.0800
(0.233)
0.0440
(0.244)
-0.120
(0.217)

2.493***
(0.262)

2.730***
(0.239)

0.528***
(0.173)
-1.019***
(0.323)
-0.390
(0.403)
-0.192
(0.206)
-0.0415
(0.239)
-0.00238
(0.254)
-0.0995
(0.219)
-0.103
(0.264)
2.676***
(0.249)

210
0.206

210
0.207

Super Recruit
Elite School * Super Recruit
Position
Black
Issues
Year
Foreign
Constant

Observations
R-squared

210
0.025
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 6. Logit Regression – Probability of Being Drafted in the N.B.A.

VARIABLES

(1)
Drafted

(2)
Drafted

(3)
Drafted

-0.00329
(0.300)
0.458
(0.431)
-0.762
(0.533)
-0.0676
(0.480)
0.899*
(0.521)
0.045
(0.834)

2.174***
(0.630)
-0.261
(0.315)
0.434
(0.447)
-0.605
(0.555)
-0.00918
(0.496)
0.880*
(0.534)
0.027
(0.643)

1.211**
(0.536)

0.912
(0.558)

1.223
(0.825)
-0.487*
(0.337)
0.459
(0.459)
-0.625
(0.560)
0.0355
(0.504)
0.784
(0.541)
-0.738
(0.556)
1.878
(1.335)
1.045*
(0.569)

210

210

Super Recruit
Elite School
Position
Black
Issues
Year
Foreign
Elite School * Super Recruit
Constant

Observations

210
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table-7.Log Odds Ratio
(1)
Drafted
Elite School

0.502
(1.43)

Position

0.169
(1.26)

Black

-0.890
(-1.49)

Issues

0.768
(1.29)

Foreign

-0.592
(-1.06)

MinFresh

_cons
N

0.00357***
(5.38)
-1.888
(-1.89)
204

t statistics in parentheses
*
p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

39

Table-8. OLS Regression – The Effect of Elite School on Draft Pick
VARIABLES

(1)
DraftPick

(2)
DraftPick

0.299
(3.139)
-2.584
(4.286)
6.769
(4.904)
11.73**
(5.134)
-10.13**
(4.574)
30.75***
(5.002)

-23.41***
(3.679)
4.100
(2.935)
-2.086
(3.924)
3.885
(4.512)
10.44**
(4.704)
-9.245**
(4.189)
35.98***
(4.651)

Super Recruit
Elite School
Position
Black
Issues
Year
Constant

Observations
R-squared

210
210
0.064
0.219
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

(3)
DraftPick

(4)
DraftPick

0.809
(4.835)
-4.924
(6.525)
12.37*
(7.336)
13.62*
(8.042)
-14.23**
(6.861)
34.39***
(7.465)

-31.84***
(5.496)
6.727
(4.531)
-4.075
(5.949)
8.314
(6.685)
11.50
(7.321)
-12.69**
(6.244)
40.82***
(6.889)

210

210

Note: Columns (3) and (4) are Tobit Models that use 61 as the upper limit for draft picks.
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Table-9 : The Effects of Elite Schools on Career Earnings

VARIABLES

(1)
earnings

(2)
Earnings

-1.107
(3.586)
4.718
(4.896)
-3.255
(5.603)
-14.30**
(5.865)
17.13***
(5.225)
17.42***
(5.713)

34.08***
(3.932)
-6.640**
(3.137)
3.994
(4.194)
0.943
(4.823)
-12.42**
(5.028)
15.84***
(4.477)
9.796*
(4.972)

Super Recruit
Elite School
Position
Black
Issues
Year
Constant

Observations
R-squared

210
210
0.089
0.335
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Career Earnings Figures Represent Millions of $.
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Tobit
(1)
earnings

Tobit
(3)
earnings

-2.593
(4.975)
5.037
(6.784)
-8.006
(7.550)
-17.01**
(8.306)
21.19***
(7.052)
13.83*
(7.683)

43.26***
(5.201)
-10.63**
(4.326)
4.163
(5.733)
-2.544
(6.359)
-13.93**
(6.997)
19.15***
(5.930)
5.162
(6.548)

210

210

Table-10. The Effects of Attending an Elite School on Log Earnings

VARIABLES

(1)
Ln(Earnings)

(2)
Ln(Earnings)

0.0177
(0.271)
0.397
(0.374)
-0.225
(0.384)
-1.606***
(0.457)
0.966***
(0.367)
2.279***
(0.388)

1.625***
(0.281)
-0.424*
(0.254)
0.365
(0.335)
-0.169
(0.344)
-1.389***
(0.411)
0.926***
(0.329)
1.969***
(0.352)

Super Recruit
Elite School
Position
Black
Issues
Year
Constant

Observations
R-squared

141
141
0.156
0.325
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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(3)
Ln(Earnings)

(4)
Ln(Earnings)

0.0637
(0.252)
0.368
(0.345)
-0.150
(0.354)
-1.505***
(0.436)
0.940***
(0.338)
2.227***
(0.359)

1.544***
(0.256)
-0.352
(0.233)
0.320
(0.305)
-0.0829
(0.313)
-1.307***
(0.388)
0.889***
(0.298)
1.939***
(0.321)

141

141

On the Wrong Side of the Cutoff:
Using Sharp Regression Discontinuity to Test for
Effects of Round Cutoffs on the Careers of N.B.A. Players

Abstract: This chapter examines the effects league imposed, arbitrary round cutoffs have had on
the career outcomes of basketball players in the National Basketball Association (N.B.A.). The
N.B.A. created these cutoffs to distinguish players who were selected in the first and second
round in their annual rookie draft. According to traditional economic theory, these round cutoffs
should not have any significant effects on the compensations and productivity of the players.
However, previous studies have shown that round effects do in fact exist in the National Football
League (N.F.L.) labor market. By using a sharp regression discontinuity design, I test to see
whether players selected at the end of the first round are significantly more productive and earn
more in player salary compared to the players chosen at the beginning of the second round. The
results from the model indicate that are no significant differences in either compensation or
productivity. A pooled cubic regression on the dependent variables is also conducted to further
verify the results. The findings support previous research that indicate that the market for
N.B.A. players has become more efficient.
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2.1 Introduction
The National Basketball Association (N.B.A.) is widely considered the premiere
basketball league in the world. Although there are many other professional basketball leagues
throughout the world, none of them can compete with the N.B.A. in terms of popularity, revenue
and player salary. In 2017, the average N.B.A. player earned approximately $6 million a year
(Basketball-reference.com, 2018). Unsurprisingly, the odds of making it to the N.B.A. are
incredibly low. Of all the prospective basketball players around the world competing for a roster
sport, roughly only 450 players make it to the league in a given year. The path most players take
to reach the N.B.A. is to first play collegiately and perform well enough to get recognized by
N.B.A. teams. The next step is to eventually enter their names in the N.B.A. draft and hopefully
get selected by one of the teams.
The N.B.A. Draft is held annually prior to the beginning of the new season. Each of the
30 teams currently in the league are awarded two draft picks; one in the first round and another
in the second. Therefore, the 31st player chosen in the draft is the first player selected in the
second round 11. The order of the first three picks in the draft are determined ahead of time by a
lottery system. The odds of winning the lottery is based inversely off the team’s previous year’s
regular season win-loss record. The system was developed in hopes of creating competitive
balance within the league but also, simultaneously to prevent teams from deliberately losing;
otherwise known as tanking. The remaining picks in the draft are then ordered beginning with

11

Teams are not required to keep these picks and are able to use them as trade assets.

44

the team with the worst record that did not acquire one of the first three picks. The second round
begins again with the team with the worst record receiving the first pick. This fact could
potentially create some concerns of selection bias if teams selecting at the cutoff were
consistently the same team(s). Fortunately, the most any team had selected last in the first round
or first in the second round was twice.12 Additionally, issue could be that second round players
are different from first round players because they are the second player chosen for each
individual team. However, this is not necessarily the case because teams often trade away or
trade for first round picks.
There are no apparent reasons to believe a significant drop off in player productivity
should occur at the arbitrary round cutoff the league has established. After all, the number of
players chosen in the first round are simply determined by the number of teams in the N.B.A.
This number has changed whenever the league has expanded. The most recent case was in 2002,
when the New Orleans Pelicans became the 30th team in the league. Also, teams often select
players based on their needs and not necessarily the best available player. Discontinuities in
outcomes at the cutoff should only exist if there are other factors that are causing them to occur.
One of the possible factors could be the differences in the contract terms of players chosen in the
first round to those of players selected in the second round.
In 1995, the N.B.A. created a rookie wage scale that granted all first-round selections a
three-year guaranteed contract - with a team option for the fourth year - from the team that
selected or traded for them. These contracts are set annually by the N.B.A., using a sliding wage
scale that pays the first selection the highest salary on the wage scale and continuously decreases

12

This was by the Cleveland Cavaliers, and they had traded to get those picks.
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for each player selected afterwards. Although this gave first rounders job security, the wage scale
created a ceiling on the number of years and money in a rookie’s contract. On the other hand,
players selected in the second round are not offered any guaranteed contracts and must negotiate
a contract with a team – first rights going to the team that selected them - or could otherwise be
cut before ever playing in the league. Despite this drawback, some overlooked second-rounders
can benefit by not having to submit to a rookie wage scale. Players selected in the second round
could potentially sign a short-term rookie deal and - if they perform exceptionally well - can then
sign a long-term contract that is worth significantly more what first rounders would be earning
under the rookie wage scale. An example of this occurred in 2003, when Gilbert Arenas - the
first player selected in the second round that year, signed a 6-year deal worth $60 million after
only his second year in the N.B.A.13 Had he been a first round pick, he would have still been
under contract for the next year, where he would have been paid roughly $1 million. Still, these
cases are an exception rather than the norm. This paper will look at whether this arbitrary
discrepancy in pay structure results in significant differences in player outcomes.
Here is the structure for the rest of the paper. Section 2 of this paper will provide a brief
overview of relevant information regarding N.C.A.A. college basketball and the N.B.A. Section
3 will provide an extensive literature review of previous papers related to this study. Section 4
will describe and summarize the data as well as the methodology used for the study. Section 5
will provide the empirical models and an interpretation of the results. Finally, Section 6 will
provide a conclusion to the paper.

13

Arenas selected the number 00 to wear on his jersey as a reminder of how many teams selected him in the first
round.
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2.2 Literature Review
Despite the different contract rules regarding first round and second round rookies,
classical labor theory suggests that N.B.A. teams will end up paying each player according to
their expected marginal productivity of labor regardless of which round they were selected
(Becker, 1989). Although the round a player was selected can provide value in determining a
player’s expected productivity with limited information, a player’s overall selection number
provides strictly dominated information that would make round information redundant and
unnecessary in the production function. This can be explained using the following model that
comes from the Keefer (2015) in describing the compensation of N.F.L. players:
'

)

= /[3(5 ) , 6 ]

where 8(9 ) indicates Player i’s expected future productivity and : indicates other
relevant variables that determine a player’s salary. Included in 8(9 ) is information regarding
both the round number and selection number of Player i.
3(5 ) = () , ' )
where ; , indicates the round Player i was chosen and < is the overall selection number.
Since < already includes information that ; provides, the function should simply be
3(5 ) = (' )
Therefore, in a competitive market, a reduction in player salaries due to a drop off in
expected productivity should come from a change in selection number rather than round
differences.
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I assume that the labor market for players is very competitive since every team must
abide by the league’s salary cap. Therefore, teams in the N.B.A. are unable to simply overpay
for better players unlike some other professional sports leagues. If teams can pay significantly
less for a player simply because he was drafted in the second round, they would look to trade
away their overpriced first round picks and acquire more picks in the second round. The market
should eventually reach an equilibrium where any initial effects round cutoffs may have caused,
are no longer present. Yet, there are evidences in highly competitive markets, where studies
have found inefficiencies to persist.
In a paper by Bondt and Thaler (1985), the researchers found that investors overreacted
to news regarding the stock market. Their research showed that the performance of portfolios
comprised of previous losers significantly outperformed ones comprised of previous winners.
This is an indication that losing stocks were being underpriced compared to winners. If true, this
study would argue against the efficient market hypothesis (EMH), which states that arbitrage
opportunities quickly disappear because stocks quickly adjust to their appropriate value (Fama,
1998). Another study showed that stock investors sell winners too early and hold on to losers too
long (Barberis, 2001). Studies from the field of behavioral economics attribute this behavior to
people’s tendencies to use mental accounting and exhibit loss aversion in their decisions (Thaler,
1999). Thaler has created his own asset management company that tries to take advantage of
these types of behavioral biases.
Research using the field of sports have also found evidence of irrational behavior.
Several studies involving the National Football League (N.F.L.), found that there are significant
differences in the perceived value and compensations between players selected in the first and
second round. Teams in the N.F.L. often overvalue first rounders and are willing to pay a
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significant premium in order to trade up for them (Massey and Thaler, 2010). The researchers
believe that this is a result of general managers displaying overconfidence in their ability to find
talent. Another relevant study showed that there are significant round effects in NFL rookie
compensation. The study uses a sharp regression discontinuity model to find that players
selected at the end of the first round are paid significantly more compared to those selected at the
beginning of the second that cannot be attributed to productivity (Keefer, 2016). Therefore, not
only are teams N.F.L. giving up more assets to acquire earlier picks, they also give more
financial compensation to players selected earlier. Another paper by Keefer and Rustamov
(2015), finds evidence that may help explain this type of irrational behavior. The study used
energy consumption data to show that people are prone to focus most on the left-most digit to
determine their usage. Likewise, teams that focus more on the round that a player was selected
rather than the overall number, many overvalue information that is insignificant.
There have also been several studies looking at whether market inefficiencies exist in the
N.B.A. Previous studies found evidence of racial discrimination in the N.B.A. by looking at the
relationship between salary and performance for black and white players (Kahn, 2009).
However, more recent studies have found that racial discrimination has since disappeared.
Basketball, like many other professional sports, offer players contracts that are essentially
guaranteed ahead of time. A group of studies have looked at whether this causes N.B.A. teams
to be susceptible to the sunk cost fallacy with mixed results. An initial study, showed that
rookies selected earlier in the draft are given significantly more playing time compared to those
chosen later when adjusting for performance (Staw and Hoang, 1995). However, a later study
that identified flaws to the original study found that there was no evidence of the sunk cost
fallacy (Leeds and Motomura, 2006). The researchers used a sharp regression discontinuity
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model to look at whether round changes had any effects on playing time. While the results from
the paper looked at playing time, the goal of this paper is to examine the effects on player
performance and career earnings. If players that are equally productive but compensated
significantly different by round, teams would be able to benefit by acquiring more second round
players.

2.3 Data and Methodology
The data collected for this study is comprised of all 612 N.B.A. players selected in the
league’s draft between the years, 2004 to 2015. The data consists of performance as well as
compensation data of the players. Any player that was not on an NBA roster during the period is
considered missing. The source of the data comes from basketball-reference.com, a website that
keeps meticulous data on the NBA.
Currently, there are a total of 60 players selected in the two rounds of the NBA Draft.
Consequently, the 31st player selected is the first player chosen in the second round. Some years
may have less than 60 players selected due to teams having to forfeit picks for violating league
rules. This has occurred a total of three times over the course of the periods examined. Each
time it has been the Minnesota Timberwolves who were forced to forfeit their pick. For these
years, there are only 29 players selected in the first round. However, regarding a player’s draft
number, it skips the Timberwolves pick and therefore the last player chosen in the first round is
still considered to be the 30th pick in the draft.
For each of the dependent variables that was tested, I used a pooled cubic regression
model that allows for interaction terms that combine both the round number as well as the overall
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draft number into the equation. However, the model may not be ideal if values that are far away
from the cutoff are heavily affecting the results. Therefore, a sharp regression discontinuity
design model is included as well for comparison. A sharp regression discontinuity model is an
effective means of looking at data where an arbitrary cutoff has led to a discontinuous jump in
the dependent variable, = . In this study the dependent variables looked at are a player’s
productivity and career earnings. In the model, ! , acts as a binary dummy variable which will
assign a value of 1 to a treatment variable, in this case players selected after the round cutoff, and
0 for players selected before the cutoff. The cutoff value in this paper is,

= 31, any player

whose draft number is 31 or later, will be assigned a value of 1. The sharp regression
discontinuity model will only work under the circumstance that there are no other observables
that are significantly different between players around the cutoff. Another criterion requires that
no other confounding factors are affecting the groups. Finally, the last requirement when using
sharp regression discontinuity is for players to be unable to self-select themselves to either side
of the cutoff. Considering the format of the N.B.A. draft, there is no reason to believe any
differences of these sort would exist (Imbens and Lemieux, 2008; McCrary, 2008). The average
treatment effect (ATE) when using sharp regression discontinuity is therefore
ATE =

∈→@A

3[ |

= C+∈ ]-

∈→@D

3[ |

ATE = E[ ( = 1) − ( = @) |

= C+∈ ]
= *]

2.4 Empirical Models and Results
The summary statistics in Table-1 compares players by the round they were selected.
The data shows that there is a clear distinction in earnings between the two groups. Players
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selected in the first round have average career earnings that are $32.91 million compared to those
selected in the second round, where average career earnings are $11.16 million. The career
earnings of first round picks are on average, $22 million more. The number of Win Shares are
also significantly different between the two groups. On average, first rounders contribute 18.61
Win Shares over the course of their career, while second rounders only contribute 6.935. These
results are both significant and unsurprising since these numbers include all the players selected
in either round. However, the objective of this paper is to focus only on the players chosen near
the round cutoffs.

Round Cutoff Effects on Player Productivity
The first test I performed looked at whether there were any significant differences in the
productivity of players around the cutoff. Selecting an objective measure of player performance
can be difficult. A player’s overall contribution to a team’s success cannot be quantified by
simply using one statistical variable, such as scoring. Other offensive statistics such as assists
along with defensive statistics such as blocks and steals should be incorporated into the
performance measurement. Also, it is important that a productivity metric take into
consideration a player’s efficiency by adjusting for playing time and field goal percentages since
a player’s scoring average can be upwardly biased if they are given more opportunities to shoot.
Lastly, there are many important contributions that a player makes that are not recorded by
traditional stats, typically on the defensive side of the game. As a result, I use the amount of Win
Shares (WS) a player contributes as the dependent variable to measure productivity. Win Shares
uses a formula that addresses many of the issues mentioned previously. Win Share data is
collected by Basketball-reference.com, where the formula is also listed. A player who has a Win
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Share of 0 is considered to not add or subtract any value compared to the average N.B.A. player.
Therefore, more Win Shares will be considered as an indicator of higher productivity.
The first test uses the following pooled cubic regression models

F

GH ) '(FG) =

K

+ I)-( 0 + J
1

K

( − *) + J )-( 0 ( − *) +
1

where Win Shares (WS) is the dependent variable. The main independent variable of interest is
whether the player was selected before or after the cutoff value of 31. Round, is a dichotomous
dummy variable, where a player selected before the cutoff is given a value of 0, or a value 1 if
the player was selected at or beyond the cutoff. Table-2 shows the results from the pooled cubic
regression model. Having been selected in the second-round accounts for a 0.470 decline in Win
Share. This number is quite small and statistically insignificant. Table-2 also shows the results
from including fixed effects. Although including fixed effects causes a greater effect of 0.508
less Win Shares, it is also not considered statistically significant.
I then used a local linear regression model to compare and confirm the initial findings.
The model uses the optimal bandwidth with triangle kernels that is recommended by Imbens and
Kalyanaraman (2009). There are three bandwidths that are tested; none find any significant
differences in Win Shares. The results that comes from the 100% bandwidth indicate a decline
of .408 Win Shares of being selected after cutoff. This number is in line with the results from
the earlier model. The results of the regressions fail to reject the null hypothesis that there are no
significant differences in the performances of players at the cutoff.
An alternative measure of productivity can be measured by using Win Shares per 48
minutes (WS48). This looks at a player’s contributions adjusted for the number of minutes
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played. If there are significant differences in playing time given to earlier drafted players as a
result of the sunk cost fallacy, WS48 would be a more accurate comparison of productivity. The
model can be expressed by the following:

F

GH ) 'LM(FGLM) =

K

+ I)-( 0 + J
1

K

( − *) + J )-( 0 ( − *) +
1

The results are listed for the pooled cubic regressions in Table-5 and the local linear
regression in Table-7. The numbers indicate that there is virtually no difference in WS48 among
players at the cutoff. On average, being selected in the second-round decreases WS48 by 0.00759 and -0.00542 when including fixed effects. To put into perspective, the summary
statistics show that the average WS48 off all players in the sample was 0.0638. The results from
the local linear regression model indicate that there is a decline in WS48 of -.0147 of being
selected in the second round. Although, far higher than the previous results, this is still
considered to be statistically insignificant. Therefore, the results are statistically insignificant.
This would support the assumption that players on both sides of the cutoff are similar in their
productivity.

Round Effects on Players Earnings
The next test I conducted looked for any difference in career earnings between those near
the cutoff. Due to differences in contract structure among first and second rounders as well as
evidence from earlier studies, there are reason to believe there will be significant differences.
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The variables on the right-hand side are identical to ones used in the previous models.
The results from the first model is listed in Table-6. The results show that the round effect has
an impact of $202,796 on rookie earnings. The local linear regression results are listed in Table7 and show that at the 100% bandwidth, rookie effects had a negative effect of $13,711 for
players chosen in the second round. Both results indicate that there are no significant differences
in rookie earnings for players on either side of the cutoff. The next model looked at the result of
round effects on the overall career earnings of players. The results indicate a positive
coefficient of $3.561 million associated with being selected in the second round. Although
surprising, this could be explained by the fact that second rounders are not subjected to a rookie
wage scale and are able to enter free agency much earlier. The initial local linear regression
model also shows that there are no differences in pay between players on both sides of the cutoff,
with second round contributing $2.788 million. The findings are consistent with the earlier
results. Table-8 shows the results of the local linear regression model with three bandwidths.
To take into consideration concerns over heteroskedasticity, I also tested the log career
earnings of players. The results were mixed in terms of the pooled cubic regression and the local
linear regression. Table-7 shows the results from the pooled regression model and finds that
being selected in the second round earns 22.7% more in career earnings, however, this number is
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insignificant. Finally, Table-9 shows the results from the local linear regression and finds that
second round players earn roughly 11% less than first rounders, also considered insignificant.
Overall, the results fail to find any significant difference of being selected beyond the round
cutoff. This could indicate that the labor market for NBA players is efficient.

2.6 Conclusion
This paper looked at whether league established round cutoffs had any significant effects
on player performance and earnings in the N.B.A. The hypothesis that there would be
differences was based off previous findings that showed significant round effects on player
compensation in the N.F.L. Additionally, other studies involving the N.B.A. have found
evidence of other examples of irrational behavior, such as the use of sunk costs in allocating
playing time. Despite my initial hypothesis, the results of my paper have failed to reject the null
hypothesis. One explanation could be that the N.B.A. labor market has become more efficient
compared to earlier years. Previous studies have found that racial discrimination in N.B.A.
player salaries have disappeared over time. Another explanation could be a result of the
subjective nature in evaluating player productivity. Earlier studies have found evidence of moral
hazard when using one performance measure but not when using another measure. The
objective of this paper was to provide additional literature to the area of sports and behavioral
economics.
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Table-1: Summary Statistics by Rounds
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
1st Round
2nd Round
Total
________________________________________________________________
Earnings

32.91
(35.33)

11.16
(20.93)

23.80
(31.98)

Games

352.6
(230.2)

170.9
(200.0)

276.5
(235.6)

WS

18.61
(22.00)

6.935
(13.26)

13.72
(19.69)

WS48

0.0780
(0.0562)

0.0441
(0.134)

0.0638
(0.0981)

Age

20.53
(1.331)

21.61
(1.296)

20.98
(1.420)

Position

3.045
3.094
3.065
(1.358)
(1.217)
(1.300)
________________________________________________________________
N
612
________________________________________________________________
mean coefficients; sd in parentheses
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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Table - 2: Pooled Cubic Results of Round Effects on Win Share

(1)
WS

(2)
WS

-0.470
(5.641)
-1.550
(1.220)
-0.129
(0.0900)
-0.00375**
(0.00190)
1.871
(1.652)
0.0843
(0.132)
0.00488
(0.00297)

8.052*
(4.505)

-0.508
(5.546)
0.352
(1.084)
-1.779
(1.617)
-0.0417
(0.0936)
-0.0763
(0.129)
0.000983
(0.00223)
-0.00448
(0.00291)
-2.421
(3.791)
6.448***
(2.051)
9.794***
(2.731)
6.032*
(3.338)

612
0.173

612
0.204

VARIABLES
Second Round
Pick-31
(Pick-31)Q
(Pick-31)R
Round*Pick-31
Round*(Pick-31)Q
Round*(Pick-31)R
Team
Position
Year
Constant

Observations
R-squared

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

61

Table -3: Local Linear Regression of Round Effects on Win Shares
(1)
WS

Bandwidth
100%

-0.408
(5.252)
-4.154
(9.875)
-2.480
(3.247)

50%
200%

Observations
612
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
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Table-4: Pooled Cubic Regression of Round Effects on WS48

VARIABLES

(1)
WS48

(2)
WS48

Second Round

-0.00759

-0.00542

(0.0303)

(0.0303)

-0.00221

-0.00173

(0.00655)

(0.00593)

-0.000203
(0.000483)
-6.41e-06
(1.02e-05)
0.00115
(0.00887)
0.000225
(0.000707)
6.08e-06
(1.60e-05)

0.0614**
(0.0242)

-7.45e-05
(0.000513)
-1.54e-06
(1.22e-05)
-0.000623
(0.00884)
-0.000287
(0.000707)
-5.04e-06
(1.59e-05)
-0.00107
(0.0207)
-0.000547
(0.0112)
-0.0126
(0.01409)
0.0566***
(0.0182)

612
0.043

612
0.044

Pick-31
(Pick-31)Q
(Pick-31)R
Round*Pick-31
Round*(Pick-31)Q
Round*(Pick-31)R
Team
Position
Year
Constant

Observations
R-squared

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table -5 Local Linear Regression of Round Effects on WS48

(1)
WS48

Bandwidth
100%

-0.0147
(0.0362)
0
(0)
-0.0343
(0.0495)

50%
200%

Observations
611
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table-6 Round Effects on Rookie Earnings

(1)
RookieEarnings

VARIABLES
Second Round

-202,976
(194,110)
-47,132
(42,581)
-108,174*
(55,368)
-4,799
(3,158)
14,832***
(4,307)
-236.2***
(66.94)
26.48
(94.56)
-107,719
(128,758)
-5,337
(71,819)
-376,741***
(92,803)
1.060e+06***
(155,941)

Pick-31
(Pick-31)Q
(Pick-31)R
Round*Pick-31
Round*(Pick-31)Q
Round*(Pick-31)R
Team
Position
Year
Constant

Observations

612

R-squared
0.726
___________________________________
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table-7 Local Linear Regression of Round Effects on Rookie Earnings

(1)
Bandwidth

RookieEarnings

100%

-13,112
(219,109)

50%

106,029
(312,047)

200%

296,745*
(156,672)

Observations

612

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table - 8 : Pooled Cubic Regression on Career Earnings
VARIABLES
Second Round
Pick-31
(Pick-31)Q
(Pick-31)R
Round*Pick-31
Round*(Pick-31)Q
Round*(Pick-31)R

(1)
Earnings

(2)
Earnings

-4.152
(7.921)
-0.884
(1.466)
0.0320
(0.120)
-0.000591
(0.00276)
-1.808
(2.270)
-0.255
(0.176)
-0.00628
(0.00388)

15.59***
(6.347)

-3.789
(7.877)
-0.734
(1.455)
0.0233
(0.120)
-0.000459
(0.00274)
-1.818
(2.254)
-0.234
(0.175)
-0.00613
(0.00385)
-3.634
(5.178)
6.973**
(2.901)
10.02***
(3.516)
13.71***
(5.968)

700
0.302

700
0.316

Team
Position
Year
Constant

Observations
R-squared

_________________________________________________________
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table-9: Local Linear Regression of Round Effects on Career Earnings

Bandwidth

Earnings

100%

-2.788
(6.808)
-4.028
(11.90)
-1.115
(4.444)

50%
200%

Observations
612
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table-10: Pooled Cubic Regression of Round Effects on Log Earnings
(1)
(2)
Ln(Earnings) Ln(Earnings)

VARIABLES
Second Round
Pick-31
(Pick-31)Q
(Pick-31)R
Round*Pick-31
Round*(Pick-31)Q
Round*(Pick-31)R

-0.201
(0.372)
-0.0280
(0.0728)
-0.00147
(0.00628)
5.36e-05
(0.000150)
-0.0684
(0.109)
-0.00336
(0.00866)
-0.000190
(0.000196)

Team
Position
Year
Constant

Observations
R-squared

1.722***
(0.222)

-0.181
(0.372)
-0.0264
(0.0727)
-0.00135
(0.00628)
4.64e-05
(0.000149)
-0.0696
(0.108)
-0.00332
(0.00866)
-0.000177
(0.000195)
-0.282
(0.254)
0.287**
(0.138)
0.207
(0.183)
1.678***
(0.224)

612
612
0.367
0.374
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table -11: Local Linear Regression of Round Effects on Log Earnings
(1)
Ln(Earnings)

VARIABLES
100%

0.118
(0.622)
-0.564
(0.976)
-0.115
(0.386)

50%
200%

Observations
612
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Measuring the Impact of the National Basketball Association (N.B.A.)
Rookie Wage Scale on the Careers of N.B.A. Players

Abstract: The final chapter of this paper looks at the impact the National Basketball Association
(N.B.A.) rookie wage scale had on subsequent player earnings and on-court performance. In
1995, a new collective bargaining agreement (C.B.A.) - that was agreed upon by the league’s
owners and players - implemented a rookie wage scale that created a ceiling on the number of
years as well as the amount of money players could earn under their rookie contract. The wage
scale was introduced to address growing concerns voiced by N.B.A. teams over the substantial
bargaining power incoming players had even before they had played a professional game.
In this chapter, I first tested to see whether the rookie wage scale fulfilled the objective of
reducing the compensation of rookies. The following test looked at whether the rookie wage
scale had any additional effects on player performance and overall compensation. By using
several econometric models, I compare the overall careers of players who entered the league
before its implementation to those who entered after the rookie wage scale was introduced.
Afterwards, I compare the average number of years played in the league as well as the average
age of draft picks between the two groups of players. As expected, rookies who entered under
the new C.B.A. earned significantly less during their first year in the league compared to their
counterparts. However, the findings also indicate that there were no significant differences in
career earnings and overall differences in player performance; both in the short and long run.
Finally, the results indicate that the average career length significantly increased for players who
entered after the rookie wage scale was implemented due to players entering the league at an
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earlier age. This could be explained by assuming that N.B.A. teams that are generally risk
averse, are more likely to take a chance on a younger prospect now that the costs associated with
doing so have substantially fallen.
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3.1 Introduction
The National Basketball Association (N.B.A.) began as a professional basketball league
in 1946. Since its inception, the popularity of the league has significantly increased, both in the
United States as well as globally. This has led to a dramatic increase in N.B.A. player’s salaries
over the years. To put into perspective, the average N.B.A. player salary has risen from
approximately $1 million in 1985 to nearly $6 million in 2018 (Basketball-reference.com, 2018).
Additionally, the share of basketball related income that goes towards player’s salaries has gone
up from approximately 51% in 2005 to 57% in 2016. This is a strong indication that the
bargaining power of the National Basketball Players Association (N.B.P.A.) - the league’s
players union - has also been increasing overtime. Despite this general trend upwards in salary,
there have been occasions where specific groups of players within the league have had their
salaries negatively affected by changes to the league’s collective bargaining agreement.
The labor market for N.B.A. players does not operate under a free market system. All
current players are members of the N.B.P.A., which negotiates with N.B.A. teams via collective
bargaining. The N.B.A. Collective Bargaining Agreement (C.B.A.) establishes frameworks for
important agreements between the N.B.A. owners and the N.B.P.A. such as player salaries,
trades between teams and rule changes to the game. Over the years, the two sides have been
involved in disagreements that have led to a total of four lockouts.14 As a result, significant
changes to the C.B.A. have been made, establishing changes to league rules and regulations.

14

The most recent was during the 2011-12 season. The lockout lasted for 161 days and cost the league 16 regular
season games for each team.
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This paper looks at how one of these changes - the introduction of a rookie wage scale impacted the careers of N.B.A. players who entered afterwards.
Prior to 1995, N.B.A. rookies were granted much more flexibility in negotiating the terms
of their rookie contracts. Many of them were able to sign long term guaranteed deals with the
team that drafted them or traded for the rights to their services. As an example, in 1994, Glenn
Robinson was the first player selected by the Milwaukee Bucks. Initially, both sides could not
come to an agreement to the terms of the contract. Eventually, there were rumors that Robinson
would threaten to sit out the entire season if he did not receive the thirteen-year, $100 million
contract he was asking for. After many months of negotiations, the two sides eventually agreed
to a ten-year deal worth $68 million. Until today, this is the largest rookie contract in the
league’s history and considered by many to be a risky move at the time. 15 Unlike most
professions, the contracts of most N.B.A. players are fully guaranteed regardless of their future
performance. A common argument given in favor of these guaranteed contracts views them as a
necessary form of insurance due to the uncertain nature of the profession. The average length of
an N.B.A. career is approximately only five years and sustaining a significant injury could
jeopardize a player’s entire career. Another supporting argument claims that guaranteed
contracts counteract the monopsony power that teams in professional sports league initially have
in the labor market (Neale, 1964).
Therefore, N.B.A. teams must face high levels of uncertainty when evaluating and
drafting players. Although there is evidence indicating a positive correlation between a player’s
draft number and their future productivity, there is a great amount of variance between each

15

Looking back, some say this was an unfavorable deal to Robinson because of substantial increases in the league’s
salary cap. Players on short term deals could become free agents earlier and sign for significantly more than those
on long term deals that could not benefit from the increase.
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individual pick. There are numerous examples of early draft picks who have failed to live up to
their lofty expectations (Yukari, 2017). Furthermore, the league operates under a salary cap
system that limits the amount of money teams can spend on players. Teams that have invested a
significant portion of their salary cap on an underachieving rookie could suffer the negative
consequences of their selection for many years. Another note of importance is that the N.B.A.
grants the teams with the worst records from the previous season a higher chance of selecting
early in the league’s annual draft. Therefore, overpaying rookies could also lead to greater
imbalances between the teams at the top and bottom of the league. A study by Szymanksi (2001)
has shown that popularity begins to decline in sports leagues that have greater inequality in team
performance within the league.
To address their concerns, N.B.A. owners proposed adding a rookie wage scale under the
league’s 1995 collective bargaining agreement. The player’s association agreed to the new deal
when owners were willing to make concessions that increased the percent of league revenue that
veteran players would receive. This is line with traditional union strategy, where the voting
power is more heavily favored by those who have been in the organization longer (Hill, 2008).
The rookie wage scale capped the maximum number of years a player could sign at three years with a team option for the fourth year. It also incorporated a sliding scale system, where the
salary of every player selected is less than that of the players chosen before them. The league
has the authority to adjust the scale on an annual basis to factor in changes to the league’s salary
cap. In this paper, I look at whether the implementation of the rookie wage scale had any
significant impacts on player earnings and productivity. The following section will look at
previous studies that are relevant to this paper. The structure of the remaining sections is as
follows: Section 2 will provide a literature review of relevant papers. Section 3 describes and

75

summarizes the data as well as the methodology used in this paper. Section 4 will provide the
empirical models and an interpretation of the results. Lastly, Section 5 will be a conclusion to
the paper.

3.2 Literature Review
The traditional economic model of worker productivity assumes that workers are utilitymaximizers whose utility has a function that increases with compensation and diminishes from
exerting additional effort. Workers are therefore inclined to shirk from their responsibilities
whenever the marginal benefit of doing so is greater than the marginal cost (Becker, 1985;
Shapiro, 1984). To combat this, employers must create an incentive-compatible compensation
system to prevent this example of moral hazard from occurring. One possible strategy would be
to use a piece-work pay system where each worker is paid according to their individual output.
However, this type of system can be difficult to monitor and often ineffective in its objective
(Gibbons, 1985). Another method is for employers to offer efficiency wages that are above the
market equilibrium wage to increase the opportunity costs of losing their job (Yellen, 1995).
Many companies have benefited from increased productivity when giving their workers
efficiency wages. However, laboratory experiments find that contrary to expectations, any initial
increases in worker productivity that are gained when subjects are given more compensation
gradually disappear over time (Fehr and Gachter, 2000). Workers seem to quickly adjust to a
new baseline of compensation.
Generally, guaranteed contracts are not thought of as an effective method of
compensation since the principal must compensate the agent regardless of future performance.
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In a one-shot game, every worker will have an incentive to shirk from their responsibilities.
However, under a finitely repeated games scenario, players may be incentivized to exert high
effort up until the last interaction (Rubinstein, 1983). Previous studies that have looked at the
effects guaranteed contracts have had on player performance indicate mixed results. One study
found that the performances of N.B.A. players worsen the further away they are from free
agency and improve significantly the season prior to becoming a free agent (Sen, 2011). The
paper uses a 3-period model to describe an N.B.A. player’s career. The results showed that the
overall effort of a player who signs a 2-period contract will be significantly greater in the second
period to that in the first. In another paper by Berri and Krautman (2006), the researchers found
that shirking amongst N.B.A. players existed when they used the N.B.A.’s method of measuring
productivity. However, when they used an alternative measure of performance, that the
researchers felt were more in line with economics’ definition of productivity, they were not able
to find shirking to exist. This indicates that performance measures can be highly subjective.
Previous studies that have focused specifically on rookie athletes have led to useful
findings. A paper by Staw and Hoang (1995), used N.B.A. rookie data to find that teams exhibit
sunk cost behaviors by unjustifiably investing more resources to players simply because they
were selected earlier in the draft. The researchers found that teams gave earlier draft picks more
playing time, were less likely to be traded, and remained in the league longer when controlling
for productivity measures. Keefer (2013), using National Football League (N.F.L.) rookie data,
finds evidence supporting an efficiency wage model of worker productivity. The paper shows a
positive relationship between increased compensation and player performance among rookies.
However, a major difference in player contracts between the N.F.L. and the N.B.A. is that the
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former does not have fully guaranteed contracts and therefore N.B.A. players may have less
incentive to exert additional effort.
Since athlete salaries generally increase over time, it is rare to find studies that look at the
effects of a decline in player earnings. A study by Keefer (2012), finds that the N.F.L. rookie
wage scale that was implemented in 2011, significantly reduced rookie earnings. Additionally,
studies have shown that people generally are concerned with their relative income rather than
their absolute income (Clark, 2008). Despite earnings salaries that are far greater than the
median worker in the United States, a rookie wage scale that leads to a loss in wages relative to
their peers may cause players to reduce their effort. In this paper, I look at whether the
implementation of the rookie wage scale had a significantly reduced player earnings and whether
this effected player performance in their first year as well as to their overall career.

3.3 Data and Methodology
All relevant data collected for this paper - such as player salaries and performance
statistics - comes from the websites, Basketball-reference.com and NBA.com. Basketballreference.com, which began in 2004, is a website that collects and continually updates a wide
variety of data regarding the N.B.A. Many studies that have looked at the N.B.A. collected their
data from the website. NBA.com is the official website of the N.B.A. - where player statistics
and facts are listed for every current as well as former N.B.A. player.
Included in the data set are a total of 278 N.B.A. players selected in the first round of the
N.B.A. draft between the years, 1990 and 1999. A few players are missing from the data set
because teams drafted overseas players that never came to the N.B.A. The period of years was
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chosen to allow for a significant sample size as well as to balance the number of years that are
before and after the rookie wage scale was implemented. It is important to note, however, that
the number of draft picks increased from 27 to 29 in 1995 due to the league adding two
expansion teams; therefore picks 28 and 29 are not used for comparison. Although the N.B.A.
Draft consists of two rounds, I limited my research on the first round since the wage scale only
applied to first round selections. As a result, without guaranteed contracts, many of the players
selected in the second round did not receive a contract. Additionally, I expect the differences in
earnings and performance to be most significantly impacted for the players chosen early in the
draft. I control for other individual and time variables such as the year a player entered the
league, the league’s salary cap for the year, the team that drafted them as well as the position that
they played.
As mentioned in an earlier chapter, finding an objective measure of N.B.A. player
performance can prove to be difficult. Although many measurements have been developed to
evaluate player productivity, each one has its advantages and disadvantages. For this paper, I
use the number of Win Shares (WS) a player contributed to his team as well as his Win Share
Per 48 Minutes (WS48) as measures of productivity. Win Shares is a method of attributing
credit for a team’s success based off a player’s contribution. It was originally developed for
baseball by Bill James, the father of Sabermetrics (James, 1988), and later transferred to measure
basketball performance. Win Shares is commonly used because it includes both offensive and
defensive measures that players contribute. I also use WS48 as a performance measure since it
adjusts for the playing time of each player. To compare earnings of players from different
years, I use earnings that are adjusted for the salary cap that year.
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3.4 Empirical Models and Results
The summary statistics listed in Table-1 compares observable characteristics of players
that were drafted before and after the rookie wage scale. The summary indicates that players
who were rookies prior to the rookie wage scale earned on average 7.3% of the league salary cap
compared to 4.2% for those who entered the league after. Figure-1 shows by year, the mean
percentage of the salary cap first round rookies earned.

The Effects of the Rookie Wage Scale on Rookie Earnings
To test for changes in initial compensation, I first looked at the effects the rookie wage
scale had on a player’s earnings during their first year in the league. To measure the effects on
rookie wages, I use the following fixed effects model:
N--O 3 )

' =

+

′

+

'*

+

+

The dependent variable, rookie earnings, takes into consideration the increases in the
NBA salary cap over time by measuring the percentage of the league’s salary cap a player earned
rather than their actual overall earnings. The vector, ′

, is comprised of control variables such

as a player’s position and the team that they played for during their rookie year. The variable,
scale, is a dichotomous dummy variable that gives a value of 1 to a player who entered after the
rookie wage scale and 0 to those who were rookies prior to the wage scale. The variable $ ,
represents year fixed effects. The model includes an interaction term between the draft number
of a player and the rookie wage scale variable. The last variable, % , is an idiosyncratic error
term.
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Table-2 presents the findings from the model, with and without the control variables.
The findings indicate that the rookie wage scale had a substantial negative impact on N.B.A.
rookie earnings. When controlling for the other variables, players who entered the after the
rookie wage scale was implemented saw their earnings decline by 2.82% of the league’s salary
cap. To put into context, the salary cap for each N.B.A. team in 1995, was $23 million.
Therefore, the average rookie earned approximately $648,600 less under the rookie wage scale.
This result was significant at the 1% level. The findings are consistent with the intended
objectives of the new collective bargaining agreement.

The Effects of the Rookie Wage Scale on Rookie Productivity
Considering the significant decrease in earnings rookies experienced after the rookie
wage scale, I predicted that it would have also caused a decrease in player productivity during
their rookie year. For the second test, I examined whether the rookie wage scale had any effects
on rookie productivity by using the following fixed effects model:
N--O FG =

+

+
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+

+

I use a player’s overall number of Win Shares (WS) they contributed during their rookie
season as the dependent variable. The variables on the right side of the equation are identical to
that of the previous model. Table-3 display the statistical results from the regressions.
Surprisingly, the results show a slight increase in the rookie year win share of players who
entered after the rookie wage scale. However, when adjusting for the control variables the
average Win Share was 0.0252 higher, an amount that is statistically insignificant. The only
variable that was significant was the player’s draft number. The findings indicate that the
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reduction in rookie salaries did not noticeably diminish the productivity of players during their
rookie season. This is somewhat surprising considering the standard view that decreased
compensation will result in lower worker productivity. However, the result could be due to
N.B.A. teams unwilling to give rookies in general enough playing time to notice a difference.

The Effects of the Rookie Wage Scale on Overall Career Productivity
I next tested to see if a decline in their rookie salary had any effects on a player’s overall
career. To test overall career productivity, I use the following fixed effects models
, )
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Table-4 shows the results from the first model. Players that entered post-rookie wage
scale had a career averages of 8.75 more Win Shares compared to players that entered before, a
figure that is significant at the 10% level. This is approximately 25% more Win Shares over the
course of their careers. However, this increase in overall productivity could have been spread
over a longer time-period. If players who entered after the rookie wage scale had longer careers,
then their actual productivity would be overestimated due to having played more games.
Therefore, it is also important to compare the Win Share per 48 Minutes (WS48) of players.
WS48 adjusts for the number of minutes a player accrues over the course of a season and
averages it out amongst all players.

The findings are listed in Table-5 and show that players

that entered after the rookie wage scale produced .00816 more WS48. This figure was not
significant at any level. Combining both results, it would indicate that players were not
performing better but playing longer.
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The Effect of the Rookie Wage Scale on the Career Length and Entering Age of Players
The next tests looked at the effects the rookie wage scale had on the number of years
players played on average as well as the average age a player entered the league. To test this, I
use the following fixed effects model:
+
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Where the first dependent variable measures the average years played in the N.B.A. The
right-hand side of the equation is identical to the previous models. Table-6 shows the results of
the model, with and without the control variables. The results from the fixed effects model
shows that players who were selected after the implementation of the new collective bargaining
agreement, played on average 1.070 years longer. The results however, fail to reject the null
hypothesis that there are no differences in the length of careers between the two groups.
Although the results are not considered significant, it is surprising considering players with
similar performances should exit the league around the same time. Therefore, I next tested to see
whether players entering post-rookie wage scale did so at a younger age. Players who would
normally wait to enter the league may be more compelled to enter under the new agreement.
The variables controlled for are identical to the earlier models. The findings show that
players selected after the rookie wage scale were approximately .743 years younger when
controlling for position, time and year variables. The findings are significant at the 1% level.
Table-7 shows the results of the model with and without the control variables. This data set only
includes the players who were drafted, and not all players that were eligible to be selected.
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Therefore, it does not tell the average age of all the players who entered the draft. However, this
is strong indication that players were choosing to enter the league earlier. Another possibility is
that risk averse teams are now more willing to invest in younger players. Younger players are
considered riskier because they are being selected based off potential rather than on court
productivity. Therefore, in the years prior to the rookie wage scale, team may have been less
likely to select younger players when force to invest a significant portion of their salary cap.
However, if there is a rookie wage scale that limits not only the pay, but the length of the rookie
contract that a player signs, teams may be more likely to draft on potential.

3.5 Conclusion

In this chapter, I examined the effects the 1995 N.B.A. rookie wage scale had on
subsequent player earnings and performance. As expected, the rookie wage scale led to a
substantial loss in rookie earnings. However, contrary to classical economic theory, a significant
reduction in first year wages did not result in a noticeable negative effect on player performance;
both in the short and long run. One possibility could be that early on in their careers, N.B.A.
players are limited in contributing on the court due to N.B.A. coaches having hesitancy in
playing them. This may underestimate the relationship the effects earnings had on rookie
performance. Another possibility could be that players, with shorter contracts players may have
stronger incentives to perform well to maximize their earnings for future contracts.
I then tested to see whether the new collective bargaining agreement effected the age
when players entered the league. The findings showed that the rule changes significantly
reduced the average age of N.B.A rookies. This also led to players remaining in the league
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longer than their counterparts who enter before the rookie wage scale. I propose that this could
have been due to a greater willingness for teams to take chances on younger players now that
their salaries were lower. The aim of this paper was to contribute to the growing literature in the
field of sports economics.
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List of First Selections in the NBA Draft

Year
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015

First
Patrick
Brad
David
Danny
Pervis
Derrick
Larry
Shaquille
Chris
Glen
Joe
Allen
Tim
Michael
Elton
Kenyon
Kwame
Yao
LeBron
Dwight
Andrew
Andrea
Greg
Derrick
Blake
John
Kyrie
Anthony
Anthony
Andrew
KarlAnthony

Last
Ewing,
Daugherty,
Robinson,
Manning,
Ellison,
Coleman,
Johnson,
O’Neal,
Webber,
Robinson,
Smith,
Iverson,
Duncan,
Olowokandi,
Brand,
Martin,
Brown,
Ming,
James,
Howard,
Bogut,
Bargnani,
Oden,
Rose,
Griffin,
Wall,
Irving,
Davis,
Bennett,
Wiggins,

Rookie
Salary
$1,250,000
$500,000
$1,046,000
$1,650,000
$2,300,000
$2,100,000
$1,955,000
$3,000,000
$1,600,000
$2,900,000
$2,473,000
$2,267,000
$2,967,840
$2,700,000
$3,375,960
$3,536,640
$3,697,400
$3,858,240
$4,018,920
$4,179,720
$4,340,520
$4,501,200
$4,662,000
$4,822,800
$4,983,480
$5,144,280
$5,144,280
$5,144,280
$5,324,280
$5,510,640

Towns,

$5,703,600
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Table – 1. Summary Statistics

_______________________________________________________________________
Pre-Wage Scale
Post-Wage Scale
Total
_______________________________________________________________________
Age

Years

Games

MPG

WS

WS48

22.03

21.31

21.66

(0.897)

(1.367)

(1.215)

9.37

10.36

9.85

(0.85)

(1.83)

(1.24)

539.3

599.6

570.4

(333.8)

(389.8)

(364.4)

21.65

22.26

21.97

(8.552)

(8.921)

(8.734)

29.29

38.49

34.04

(32.79)

(44.01)

(39.19)

0.0737

0.0812

0.0775

(0.0452)

(0.0595)

(0.0531)

________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
mean coefficients; sd in parentheses
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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Table-2. Estimates of Rookie Wage Scale on Rookie Earnings

VARIABLES

Draft Pick
Scale
Draft Pick*Scale

(1)
Rookie
Earnings

(2)
Rookie
Earnings

-0.0592***
(0.0148)
-0.0295***

-0.0587***
(0.0147)
-0.0282***

(0.00396)
-0.0393*

(0.00418)
-0.0391*

(0.0209)

(0.0207)
-0.0124
(0.00917)

Position
Team

-0.00490
(0.00535)

Years
0.0396***

0.00736
(0.00693)
0.0411***

(0.00275)

(0.00293)

278
0.312

278
0.327

Constant

Observations
R-squared

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table-3. Estimates of Rookie Wage Scale on Rookie Win Shares

VARIABLES

Draft Pick
Scale
Draft Pick*Scale

(1)

(2)

Rookie
WS

Rookie
WS

-.1323***

-.1328***

(.0220)

(.0223)

0.0681

0.0252

(0.247)

(0.263)

-.0143

-.0124

(.0302)

(.0298)

Position

-0.666
(0.578)

Team

-0.280
(0.337)

Years

-0.253
(0.437)

Constant

1.594***

1.678***

(0.172)

(0.184)

278

278

0.186

0.193

Observations
R-squared

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table-4. Estimates of Rookie Wage Scale on Career Win Shares

VARIABLES

Draft Pick
Scale
Draft Pick*Scale

(1)
Career
WS

(2)
Career
WS

-2.102***
(0.373)
9.613**
(4.575)
-0.458
(0.510)

-2.093***
(0.377)
8.750*
(4.829)
-0.550
(0.504)
-17.38
(10.58)
-14.07**
(6.230)
-6.296
(7.994)
39.67***
(3.377)

Position
Team
Year
Constant

36.42***
(3.186)

Observations
278
278
R-squared
0.097
0.122
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table-5. Estimates of Rookie Wage Scale on
Career WS48

VARIABLES

Draft Pick
Scale
Draft Pick*Scale

(1)
Career
WS48

(2)
Career
WS48

-0.0406*
(0.0239)
0.00892
(0.00641)
-0.0213
(0.0338)

-0.0394*
(0.0236)
.00816
(0.00674)
-0.0218
(0.0334)
-0.0332**
(0.0148)
-0.0175**
(0.00869)
-0.00593
(0.0112)
0.0845***
(0.00471)

Position
Team
Years
Constant

0.0798***
(0.00446)

Observations
278
278
R-squared
0.039
0.070
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table-6. Estimates of Rookie Wage Scale on Years Played in the League

VARIABLES
Draft Pick
Scale
Draft Pick*Scale

(1)

(2)

Years

Years

-0.299***

-0.291***

(0.0463)

(0.0464)

1.298*

1.070*

(1.001)

(1.016)

-0.00252

0.00412

(0.0625)

(0.0629)

Position

-2.042*
(1.196)

Team

-0.756
(0.699)

Year

-0.655
(0.898)

Constant

10.19***

10.60***

(0.402)

(0.425)

278

278

0.261

0.268

Observations
R-squared

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table-7. Estimate of Rookie Wage Scale on Average Age of Draft Picks

(1)
Draft
Age

(2)
Draft
Age

-0.0370***
(0.0126)
-0.764***
(0.278)
-0.000198
(0.0169)

-0.0368***
(0.0126)
-0.743***
(0.284)
-0.00128
(0.0171)
0.120
(0.325)
0.154
(0.190)
0.0230
(0.244)
21.48***
(0.209)

VARIABLES

Draft Pick
Scale
Draft Pick*Scale
Position
Team
Year
Constant

21.51***
(0.200)

Observations
R-squared

278
278
0.149
0.152
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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